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Abstract
We consider a class of two-player turn-based zero-
sum games on graphs with reachability objectives,
known as reachability games, where the objective
of Player 1 (P1) is to reach a set of goal states, and
that of Player 2 (P2) is to prevent this. In partic-
ular, we consider the case where the players have
asymmetric information about each other’s action
capabilities: P2 starts with an incomplete infor-
mation (misperception) about P1’s action set, and
updates the misperception when P1 uses an action
previously unknown to P2. When P1 is made aware
of P2’s misperception, the key question is whether
P1 can control P2’s perception so as to deceive P2
into selecting actions to P1’s advantage? We show
that there might exist a deceptive winning strategy
for P1 that ensures P1’s objective is achieved with
probability one from a state otherwise losing for P1,
had the information being symmetric and complete.
We present three key results: First, we introduce
a dynamic hypergame model to capture the reach-
ability game with evolving misperception of P2.
Second, we present a fixed-point algorithm to com-
pute the Deceptive Almost-Sure Winning (DASW)
region and DASW strategy. Finally, we show that
DASW strategy is at least as powerful as Almost-
Sure Winning (ASW) strategy in the game in which
P1 does not account for P2’s misperception. We
illustrate our algorithm using a robot motion plan-
ning in an adversarial environment.
1 Introduction
Synthesis of winning strategies in reachability games is a cen-
tral problem in reactive synthesis [Pnueli and Rosner, 1989],
control of discrete event systems [Ramadge and Wonham,
1989], and robotics [Fainekos et al., 2009]. In a two-player
reachability game, a controllable player, P1 (pronoun “she”),
plays against an uncontrollable adversarial player, P2 (pro-
noun “he”), to reach the goal states. These games have
been extensively studied in algorithmic game theory [de Al-
faro et al., 2007] and reactive synthesis [Bloem et al., 2012].
Polynomial-time algorithms are known for synthesizing sure-
winning and almost-sure winning strategies, when both play-
ers have complete and symmetric information. However, the
solution concepts for such games under asymmetric informa-
tion have not been thoroughly studied.
Information asymmetry arises when a player has some pri-
vate information that are not shared with others [Rasmusen,
1989]. We consider the case when P1 has complete infor-
mation about both players’ action capabilities, but P2 starts
with an incomplete information about P1’s action capabili-
ties. As two players interact, their information evolves. Par-
ticularly, when P1 uses an action previously unknown to P2,
P2 can update his knowledge about the other’s capabilities
using an inference-mechanism. In response, P2 would update
his counter-strategy. We are interested in the following ques-
tion: if P1 is made aware of the initial information known to
P2 and his inference mechanism, can P1 find a strategy to
control P2’s information in such a way that P2’s counter-
strategy given his evolving information is advantageous to
P1? In the context of reachability game, the question trans-
lates to: from a state that is losing for P1 in a game with
symmetric information, can P1 reach his goal from the same
state when the information is asymmetric? We note that a
strategy of P1 that controls P2’s information to P1’s advan-
tage is indeed deceptive [Ettinger and Jehiel, 2010]. In this
paper, we show that such a deceptive winning strategy may
exist and propose an algorithm to synthesize it.
We approach the question based on the modeling and so-
lution concepts of hypergame [Bennett, 1977]. A hyper-
game allows players to play different games and further al-
lows players to model the games that others are playing. In
the literature, hypergames and Bayesian games are common
models to capture game-theoretic interactions with asymmet-
ric, incomplete information. In Bayesian games, each player
uses his incomplete information to define a probability dis-
tribution over the possible types of the opponent. The dis-
tributions over types are assumed to be common knowledge.
In hypergames, no such probabilistic characterizations of in-
complete information is used or assumed. For action decep-
tion, P2 has incomplete information about P1’s capabilities
but does not have a prior knowledge about the set of possible
types of P1. Thus, we adopt the hypergame model [Ghare-
sifard and Corte´s, 2012] to understand action deception. In
the past, hypergame model has been used to study deception
[Gutierrez et al., 2015; Kovach, 2016]. These papers mainly
focus on extending the notion of Nash equilibrium to level-k
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normal form hypergames. [Gharesifard and Corte´s, 2014] use
the notion of H-digraph to establish necessary and sufficient
conditions for deceivability. An H-digraph models a hyper-
game as a graph with nodes representing different outcomes
in a normal-form game. However, our game model is not a
normal-form game, but instead a game on graph. A hyper-
game model based on a game on graph has been defined in
[Kulkarni and Fu, 2019] where one player has incomplete in-
formation about the other’s task specification. However, their
model assumes that the misperception of P2 remains constant,
whereas in our case, the game is dynamic with both players’
evolving perception.
To synthesize deceptive strategies, we first define a dy-
namic hypergame on graph and then introduce an algorithm
to identify the deceptive almost-sure winning region, which
contains a set of states from where P1 has a deceptive strat-
egy to ensure that the goal is reached with probability one.
Our main contributions are as follows.
A Modeling Framework with Dynamic Hypergame The
dynamic hypergame on graph models (i) the evolving infor-
mation of P2, and (ii) the P1’s information regarding current
perception of P2.
DASW Synthesis Algorithm We propose an algorithm to
identify the DASW region and synthesize a DASW strategy.
We prove that the computed DASW region is a superset of
ASW region, which implies that the DASW strategy is at least
as powerful as the ASW strategy.
2 Preliminaries
Let Σ be a finite alphabet. A sequence of symbols w =
w0w1 . . . wn with wi ∈ Σ, i = 0, 1, . . . , n is called a finite
word and Σ∗ is the set of finite words that can be generated
with alphabet Σ. We denote by Σω , the set of ω-regular words
obtained by concatenating the elements in Σ infinitely many
times. Given a set X , let Dist(X) be the set of probability
distributions over X . Given a distribution δ ∈ Dist(X), the
set Supp(δ) = {x ∈ X | δ(x) > 0} is called the support of
the distribution.
2.1 Games on Graph
Consider an interaction between two players; P1 with a reach-
ability objective and P2 with an objective of preventing P1
from completing her task.
Definition 1 (Game on Graph). Let the action sets of P1 and
P2 be A1 and A2, respectively. Then, a turn-based game on
graph is the tuple
G = 〈S,Act, T, F 〉,
where
• S = S1 ∪ S2 is the set of states partitioned into P1’s
states, S1, and P2’s states, S2. P1 chooses an action
when s ∈ S1 and P2 chooses an action when s ∈ S2.
• Act = A1 ∪A2 is set of actions for P1 and P2.
• T : S × Act → S is a deterministic transition function
that maps a state and an action to a successor state.
• F ⊆ S is a set of final states.
A trace in the game G is an infinite, ordered sequence
of state-action pairs τ = (s0, a0), (s1, a1), (s2, a2), . . .. We
write τ [n] = (sn, an) to denote n-th state-action pair, and
τ [m : n] = (sm, am), . . . , (sn, an) to denote a state-action
pairs betweenm-th and n-th step, both inclusive. A run is the
projection of trace onto the state-space. We denote it as the
sequence ρ = τ S= s0s1s2 . . .. Similarly, the action-history
is the projection of trace onto the action space, denoted by
α = τ Act= a0a1a2 . . .. The k-th element in a run (resp.
action-history) is denoted by ρk (resp. αk).
In this paper, we consider reachability objectives for P1.
The set of states that occur in a run is given by Occ(ρ) =
{s ∈ S | ∃k ∈ N · s = ρk}. A run is said to be winning for
P1 in the reachability objective if it satisfies Occ(ρ)∩F 6= ∅.
If a run is not winning for P1, then it is winning for P2.
ASW Strategy A stochastic or randomized strategies for
P1 and P2 are defined as pi : S1 → Dist(A1) and σ : S2 →
Dist(A2), respectively. Let Ωpi,σs be the exhaustive set of runs
that result when P1 and P2 play strategies pi and σ in a game
starting at the state s ∈ S. The randomized strategies of P1
and P2 induce a Markov chain from G–that is, a probability
distribution over the set Ωpi,σs .
Given a state s ∈ S, a randomized strategy pi is almost-sure
winning for P1, if and only if for every possible randomized
strategy σ of P2, the probability is one for a run that satisfies
Occ(ρ) ∩ F 6= ∅, given the distribution of runs induced by
(pi, σ). A state is called an almost-sure winning state for P1,
if there exists an almost-sure winning strategy for P1 from
that state. The exhaustive set of almost-sure winning states
for P1 is called her almost-sure winning region. The almost-
sure winning region can be computed using Alg. 1 based on
the Proposition 1.
Algorithm 1 Zielonka’s Algorithm
Inputs: G, F
1: Z0 = F
2: while True do
3: Pre1(Zk) = {s ∈ S1 | ∃a ∈ A1 s.t. T (s, a) ∈ Zk}
4: Pre2(Zk) = {s ∈ S2 | ∀b ∈ A2 : T (s, b) ∈ Zk}
5: Zk+1 = Zk ∪ Pre1(Zk) ∪ Pre2(Zk)
6: if Zk+1 = Zk then
7: End Loop
8: end if
9: end while
10: return Zk
Proposition 1. (From [de Alfaro et al., 2007, Thm 3]) In a
deterministic and turn-based game, the almost-sure winning
region is equal to sure-winning region.
Let us introduce a running example that we shall use to
explain the concepts in this paper.
Example 1. Consider the game graph in Fig. 1. The circle
states, {s1, s3}, are P1 states and the square states, {s0, s2},
are P2 states. The objective of P1 is to reach to the final state
s0 from the initial state s2. P1’s action set is A1 = {a1, a2},
and P2’s action set is A2 = {b1, b2}.
s0
s1 s2
start
s3
a1
a2
b1
b2 a1 a2
Figure 1: An example game on graph
The ASW region for P1 in the game is Win1 = {s0, s1}.
This can intuitively be understood as follows. P1 can win
from state s1 by choosing the action a1. However, the states
s2 and s3 are losing for P1 because P2 has a strategy to indef-
initely restrict the game within the states s2, s3 by choosing
the action b2 at the state s2.
2.2 Action Misperception and Information
Asymmetry
In this paper, we make the following assumption about the
reachability game, in which the P2 has asymmetric informa-
tion about P1’s action capabilities.
Assumption 1. P1 has complete information about the play-
ers’ action sets, i.e. P1 knows A1 and A2. P2 only knows his
own action set A2, but (mis)perceives P1’s action set to be
a subset X ( A1. Both players have complete information
about the game state-space S, transition function T and the
final states F .
The result of Assumption 1 is that P1 and P2, in their
minds, play different games to synthesize their respective
strategies. We refer to these games as the perceptual games
of the players. P1’s perceptual game is identical to the
ground-truth game; G(A1) = 〈S,A1 ∪ A2, T, F 〉, while P2’s
perceptual game is a game under misperception; G(X) =
〈S,X ∪ A2, T, F 〉. Let us formalize the new notation used
to distinguish between the perceptual games of P1 and P2.
Notation 1. Let X ⊆ A1 be a subset of P1’s action set. We
denote a perceptual game in which P1’s action set is X by
G(X) = 〈S,X ∪ A2, T, F 〉. The winning regions for P1 and
P2 in the game G(X) are denoted by Win1(X) and Win2(X),
respectively.
Assuming P1 and P2 to be rational players, they would
use the solution approach reviewed in Section 2.1 to compute
their winning strategies in their respective perceptual games.
That is, P1 will solve G(A1) in her mind to obtain pi and P2
will solve G(X) in his mind to compute σ. However, P1 is
likely to compute a conservative strategy; because she over-
estimates the information available to P2. Naturally, we want
to know whether P1 can improve her strategy if she is made
aware of P2’s current misperception X?
Before we answer the above question, recall from Section 1
that we allow P2’s misperception to evolve during the game.
For instance, what would happen when P2 observes P1 play-
ing an action a ∈ A1, which P2 did not believe to be in P1’s
action set? We might argue that P2 will at least add a new
action a to his perceived action set, X , of P1. Thus, the new
s0
s1 s2
start
s3
a2
b1
b2 a2
Figure 2: Perceptual game of P2
perception would be X ∪ {a}. Also, P2 might be capable of
complex inference. That is, on observing that P1 can perform
an action a, P2 might infer that P1 must be capable of actions
b and c, thus, updating his perception set to X ∪ {a, b, c}. To
capture such inference capabilities, we introduce a generic
perception update function for P2 as follows,
Definition 2 (Inference Mechanism). A deterministic infer-
ence mechanism is a function η : 2A1 ×A∗1 → 2A1 that maps
a subset of actions X ⊆ A1 and a finite action-history α to
an updated subset of actions Y = η(X,α) such that if there
exists an action a /∈ X which is present in α, then a ∈ Y .
Given the formalism of inference mechanism to capture the
evolving misperception of P2 during the game, we now pro-
ceed to defining our problem statement.
2.3 Problem Statement
When P2’s misperception evolves during the game, P1 should
also strategize to reveal an action that is not currently known
to P2. By doing so, P1 may control the evolution of P2’s
misperception to her advantage. Let us revisit Example 1 to
develop an intuition of how P1 might control P2’s perception.
Example 2 (Example 1 contd.). Suppose that, in Example 1,
P2 starts with a misperception about P1’s action capabilities
as X0 = {a2}. In this setup, let us understand the perceptual
games of the players. P1’s perceptual game; G1 = G(A1), is
the same as the ground-truth game as shown in Fig. 1. P2’s
perceptual game, initially, is the game G2 = G(X0) that does
not include edges labeled with action a1 as shown in Fig. 2.
Clearly, as the final state s0 is not reachable in G2, P2 mis-
perceives both actions b1 and b2 to be safe to play at state s2,
when only the action b2 is safe in the ground-truth game.
When P1 is aware of P2’s misperception, X0, a deceptive
strategy should, intuitively, not use a1 unless game state is s1.
Assuming P2 uses a randomized strategy with support A2, it
is easy to compute that the probability of reaching the state s1
is one. At s1, P1 can win the game by choosing a1 in one step.
We note that if P1 uses a1 in state s3, then P2 will update his
perception to X1 = A1, and mark the action b1 to be unsafe
in state s2. Thus, P1 will never be able to win the game.
We call such a strategy of P1, where she intentionally con-
trols P2’s misperception, as an action-deceptive strategy or
simply a deceptive strategy (see Def. 6 for a formal defini-
tion). We formalize our problem statement.
Problem 1. Consider a reachability game under information
asymmetry in which Assumption 1 holds. If P1 is informed of
the initial misperception of P2, X0, and his inference mecha-
nism η, then determine a DASW strategy for P1 to satisfy her
reachability objective.
In particular, we want to investigate whether the use of de-
ception is advantageous for P1 or not. We say P1 gets advan-
tage with deception if at least one game state that is almost-
sure losing for P1 in the game without deception becomes
winning for her with use of deception.
3 Dynamic Hypergame for Action Deception
When two players play different games in their minds, their
interaction is better modeled as a hypergame [Bennett, 1977].
Definition 3 (First-level Hypergame). A first-level hyper-
game is defined as a tuple of the perceptual games being
played by the players,
H1 = 〈G1,G2〉,
where the P1 (resp. P2) solves the game G1 (resp. G2) to
compute the winning strategy.
When one of the players is aware of the other player’s per-
ception, but the other player is not, we say that a second-level
hypergame is being played. In line with Problem 1, we as-
sume that P1 is aware of the P2’s misperception, i.e. P1 knows
the action set X ⊆ A1 as perceived by P2. If P1 knows X ,
then P1 can construct the perceptual game of P2, G(X), and
therefore P1 knows the first-level hypergameH1.
However, P2’s perception evolves when he observes P1 us-
ing actions that are not included in X . This means that the
game G(X) changes when P2’s perception changes, and so
does the hypergameH1. We now define a graph to model the
hypergame representing the evolving misperception of P2,
called as a dynamic hypergame on graph.
Definition 4 (Dynamic Hypergame on Graph). Let Γ :
{1, 2, . . . , 2|A1|} be an indicator set. Let γ : Γ → 2A1 be
a bijection from the indicator set to the power set of A1. We
define the dynamic hypergame on graph as
H = 〈V,Act,∆,F〉,
where
• V = S × Γ is the set of hypergame states,
• Act = A1 ∪A2 is the set of actions of P1 and P2,
• ∆ : V × Act → V is the transition function such that
(s, i)
a−→ (s′, i′) if and only if s′ = T (s, a) and γ(i′) =
η(X, {a}) where X = γ(i),
• F = F × Γ is the set of final states.
For convenience, we shall refer to the dynamic hypergame
on graph as simply hypergame in the remainder of the pa-
per. Analogous to game on graph, a trace in a hypergame
is an infinite, ordered sequence of state-action pairs given
by τ = (v0, a0)(v1, a1) . . . and the action-history is de-
fined as α = τ Act= a0a1a2 . . .. In contrast with the
game on graphs, we distinguish between a hypergame-run
(h-run) as a projection of trace onto the hypergame state-
space ν = τ V = v0v1v2 . . . and a game-run as a projec-
tion of trace onto game state-space ρ = τ S= s0s1s2 . . .,
(s0, 0)
(s1, 1) (s2, 1)
start
(s3, 1) (s1, 0)
(s2, 0) (s3, 0)
a1
a2
b1
b2 a1a2
a1
a2 b1
b2
a1 ∨ a2
Figure 3: The dynamic hypergame on graph
where sk is the game state corresponding to hypergame state
vk = (sk, ·). A reachability objective is said to be satisfied
over the hypergame if and only if Occ(ν) ∩ F 6= ∅, i.e. the
hypergame-run ν visits a winning state in F . By definition,
the following statement is always true; Occ(ρ)∩F 6= ∅ if and
only if Occ(ν) ∩ F 6= ∅.
Example 3 (Example 1 contd.). The hypergame modeling
the asymmetric information from Example 2 is shown in
Fig. 3 (the figure only shows the reachable states). Ev-
ery state is represented a tuple (si, j) where j = 0, 1
represents the current misperception of P2. The bijection
map is defined as γ(0) = A1 and γ(1) = {a2}. The
traces τ1 = ((s2, 1), b1) , ((s1, 1), a1) , (s0, 0), and τ2 =
((s2, 1), b2) , ((s3, 1), a2) , ((s2, 0), b1) , ((s1, 1), a1) , (s0, 0)
are the examples of winning traces in the hypergame.
4 Deceptive Almost-Sure Winning Strategy
In this section, we present an algorithm to synthesize DASW
strategies in the hypergame. The algorithm relies on an as-
sumption about P2’s strategy, which requires us to revisit the
concept of permissive strategies in a game on graph.
Recall that an action is permissive for a player at a given
state if the player can stay within the winning region by per-
forming that action [Bernet et al., 2002]. In a game under
information asymmetry, whether a state is winning or not de-
pends on the player’s perception. Hence, we define the notion
of perceptually permissive actions, which extends the defini-
tion of permissive actions to model evolving perception.
Definition 5 (Perceptually Permissive Actions). Let u =
(s, i) and v = (s′, i′) be two hypergame states such that
v = ∆(u, b) for some b ∈ A2. Let X = γ(i) and X ′ = γ(i′)
be the misperception of P2 at states u and v, respectively.
Then, the set M(u) = {b ∈ A2 | s′ ∈ Win2(X ′)} is the set
of perceptually permissive actions at u.
In words, the perceptual permissive actions for a given state
u = (s, i) is the set of permissive actions in the perceptual
game, with index i.
Assumption 2. At a state v ∈ V2, P2 plays a randomized
strategy, σ, defined over the perceptually permissive actions
M(v) such that Supp (σ(v)) = M(v).
Now, we formalize the notion of DASW strategy.
Definition 6 (Deceptive Almost-Sure Winning Strategy).
Given a hypergame state v ∈ V , a strategy pi is said to be
deceptive almost-sure winning strategy for P1 if and only if
for every strategy of P2 satisfying Assumption 2, the prob-
ability of an h-run ν induced from H by (pi, σ) satisfying
Occ(ν) ∩ F 6= ∅ is one.
The states at which P1 has a DASW strategy are called as
DASW states. The exhaustive set of all DASW states is called
as DASW region.
Now, we discuss Alg. 2 that computes the DASW region
for P1. Our algorithm is inspired by the algorithm presented
in [de Alfaro et al., 2007] to compute the ASW region in the
concurrent ω-regular games. The idea behind Alg. 2 is to
identify the states where P2 perceives some unsafe actions as
safe due to misperception. This is achieved by modifying the
SAFE-1 and SAFE-2 sub-routines from ASW region compu-
tation algorithm in [de Alfaro et al., 2007] using the following
definitions:
DAPre11(U) = {v ∈ V1 | ∃a ∈ A s.t. ∆(v, a) ∈ U},
DAPre21(U) = {v ∈ V2 | ∀b ∈M(v) s.t. ∆(v, b) ∈ U},
DAPre12(U) = {v ∈ V1 | ∀a ∈ A s.t. ∆(v, a) ∈ U},
DAPre22(U) = {v ∈ V2 | ∀b ∈M(v) s.t. ∆(v, b) ∈ U}.
The Alg. 2 works as follows. It starts with the ASW re-
gion; Z0 = Win1(A1)× Γ, and then iteratively expands it by
invoking SAFE-2 followed by SAFE-1 until a fixed-point is
reached. The SAFE-1 sub-routine computes the largest subset
U of the input set Y , such that P1 has a strategy to restrict the
game indefinitely within U . SAFE-2 sub-routine computes
the largest subset U of the input set Y , such that P2; given
his current (mis)perception, can restrict the game indefinitely
within U . Here, it is important to note that P2 chooses his ac-
tions based on his perceptual game G(X), and not the hyper-
game. Only P1 knows the hypergame because she is aware
of P2’s misperception. As a consequence, before reaching
the fixed-point, SAFE-2 might include states from which P2
may not have a strategy to indefinitely restrict P1 from reach-
ing Z0, i.e. P1 may have a DASW strategy from these states.
However, after reaching the fixed-point, say in the iteration k,
we show that all DASW states are included in Zk. A DASW
strategy can then be computed based on the proof of Thm. 2.
Let us now revisit the Example 3 to understand Alg. 2.
Example 4 (Example 3 contd.). Consider the hypergame
graph as shown in Fig. 3. Recall from Example 1 that ASW
region is Win1(A1) = {s0, s1}, therefore, we have Z0 =
{(s0, 0), (s1, 0), (s1, 1)}. The perceptually permissive ac-
tions for P2 are µ((s2, 1)) = {b1, b2} and µ((s2, 0)) = {b2}.
Iteration 1 of DASW. The first step is to compute C0,
i.e. the subset of V \ Z0 which P2 perceives to be safe for
himself. The SAFE-2 sub-routine takes 3 iterations to reach a
fixed-point, at the end of which C0 = {(s2, 0), (s3, 0)}. The
next step is to compute Z1, which the largest subset of V \C0
in which P1 can stay indefinitely. The SAFE-1 sub-routine
takes 2 iterations to reach a fixed point. In its first iteration,
DAPre11 adds a state (s3, 1) and DAPre
2
1 adds a state (s2, 1)
toZ1. The interesting observation here is that (s2, 1) is added
because the actions b1 and b2 are perceptually permissive ac-
tions for P2, both of which lead to a state in V \ C0.
Iteration 2 of DASW. The fixed-point of DASW
algorithm is reached in second iteration with Z2 =
Algorithm 2 Computation of the DASW region and strategy
for P1
1: function DASW(H)
2: Z0 = Win1(A)× Γ
3: while True do
4: Ck = SAFE-2(V \ Zk)
5: Zk+1 = SAFE-1(V \ Ck)
6: if Zk+1 = Zk then
7: End loop
8: end if
9: end while
10: return Zk
11: end function
1: function SAFE-i(U )
2: Y0 = U
3: while True do
4: W1 = DAPre
1
i (Yk)
5: W2 = DAPre
2
i (Yk)
6: Yk+1 = Yk ∩ (W1 ∪W2)
7: if Yk+1 = Yk then
8: End loop
9: end if
10: end while
11: return Yk
12: end function
{(s0, 0), (s1, 0), (s1, 1), (s2, 1), (s3, 1)}. The states (s2, 1)
and (s3, 1) are idenitifed as the DASW states for P1.
With this intuition, we proceed to proving our first main re-
sult that establishes the existence of a game state s ∈ S which
is losing for P1 in the game G(A1), but becomes winning for
P1 in the hypergame by using action-deception.
Theorem 1. The DASW region may contain a state v = (s, i)
such that s /∈Win1(A1).
Proof. We want to show the existence of an example where
a hypergame state (s, i) ∈ V is a DASW state but the game
state s is not ASW state for P1. Observe that the states (s2, 1)
and (s3, 1) in Example 4 satisfy the above condition.
Next, we proceed to prove the correctness of Alg. 2 by
showing that from every state identified by the algorithm as a
DASW state, we can construct a DASW strategy for P1 to en-
sure a visit to final states with probability one. We first prove
two lemmas.
Lemma 1. In the i-th iteration of Alg. 2, P1 has a strategy to
restrict the game indefinitely within Zi, for all states in Zi.
Proof. (v ∈ V2). For a P2’s state in Zi, every state v′ =
∆(v, b) for a perceptually permissive action b ∈ µ(v) of P2
is in Zi, by definition of DAPre21. Hence, no action of P2 at
any state v ∈ Zi can lead the game state outside Zi.
(v ∈ V1). For every P1’s state in Zi, there exists an ac-
tion a ∈ A such that the successor v′ = ∆(v, a) is in Zi,
by definition of DAPre11. Hence, P1 always has an action,
consequently a strategy, to stay within Zi.
Lemma 2. For every state v ∈ Zi+1 \ Zi added in the i-th
iteration of Alg. 2, there exists an action that leads into Zi.
Proof. Consider the partitions of V at the beginning of the
i-th iteration. There can be at most 3 partitions; namely (a)
Ci−1, (b) Zi, and (c) V \ (Ci−1 ∪ Zi). We will prove the
statement by showing that the every new state added to Zi+1
has at least one transition into Zi.
Consider i-th iteration of Alg. 2. The sub-routine SAFE-2
will add a P1 state v ∈ V1 \ Zi to Ci if all the actions of P1
stay within V \ Zi. Similarly, SAFE-2 will include a P2 state
v ∈ V2 \ Zi in Ci if all perceptually permissive actions of P2
lead to a state within V \ Zi. Therefore, a state that is not
included in Ci must have at least one action leading outside
V \ Zi, i.e. entering Zi. In the next step, the sub-routine
SAFE-1 may add new states to Zi+1 from the set V \Ci. But,
all states in V \Ci have an action entering Zi. Hence, all new
states added to Zi+1 satisfy the statement.
From Lemma 2, it is easy to see that P1 has a strategy to
reach Zi from a state added to Zi+1 in one-step. However,
this is not true for P2. From a P2 state in Zi+1, there exists
a positive probability to reach Zi because of Assumption 2.
In the next theorem, we prove a stronger statement that from
every state in Zi+1, P1 can reach not only Zi but also Z0 with
probability one.
Theorem 2. From every DASW state, P1 has a DASW strat-
egy.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. For
any v ∈ Zi, P1 has a strategy to stay within Zi indefinitely,
by Lemma 1. Furthermore, by Lemma 2, the probability
of reaching to a state v′ ∈ Zi−1 from v is strictly positive.
Therefore, given a run of infinite length, the probability of
reaching Zi−1 from Zi is one. By repeatedly applying the
above argument, we have the probability of reaching Z0 from
Zi is one.
The DASW strategy can be constructed based on the proof
of Thm. 2. At a P1 state v ∈ V1, if i ≥ 1 is the smallest
integer such that v ∈ Zi, then pi(v) = {a ∈ A1 | v′ =
∆(v, a) and v′ ∈ Zi−1} is the DASW strategy of P1 at v.
We also state the following two important corollaries (proofs
omitted due to space) follow from Thm. 1 and Lemma 2.
Corollary 2.1. For every i ≥ 0, we have Zi ⊆ Zi+1.
Corollary 2.2. The projection of DASW region onto the game
states is a superset of the ASW region.
5 An Illustrative Example
We present a robot motion planning example over a 4 × 4
gridworld, shown in Fig. 4, to illustrate how a robot (P1)
may use action deception in presence of an adversary (P2).
The objective of the robot is to visit the two cells (3, 1) and
(3, 3) containing the flags, while the task of the adversary is
to prevent this. The readers familiar with Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) may recognize the above objective as a co-safe
LTL specification ♦G1 ∧ ♦G2. The action set of the robot
is A1 = {N, E, S, W, NE, NW, SW} while that of adversary
is A2 = {N, E, S, W}, where N, E, S, W stand for north,
east, south and west. At the start of the game, the adver-
sary has incomplete information about the robot’s action set
as X0 = {N, E, S, W}. When the adversary observes the
Figure 4: A game between a robot and its adversary on the grid-
world.
robot performing any of the actions from {NE, NW, SW}, he
updates his perception to X1 = A1.
A game on graph representing above scenario can be con-
structed using the product operation given in [Baier and
Katoen, 2008, Def. 4.16]. Every game state is a tuple
(x1, y1, x2, y2, t, q) where xi, yi for i = 1, 2 denote the cell
that P1 and P2 occupy, t represents the player who chooses
the next move and q denotes a state of a Deterministic Fi-
nite Automaton (DFA) that keeps track of the progress P1
has made towards completion of her objective. The resulting
game has 44×2×4 = 2048 states. We mark the states where
P1 or P2 collide with an obstacle or with each other as the
losing states for both players and, therefore, any action that
leads to such states is disabled. Given the game on graph,
a hypergame graph is constructed according to Def. 4. The
hypergame graph has 2048 × 2 = 4096 states because the
adversary has two information states; X0 and X1.
When the above hypergame graph is given as an input to
the Alg. 2, 2106 out of 4096 states are identified as DASW
states. The projection of DASW states onto game state space
results in 1172 states, while the ASW region has the size of
934 states. This means that 1172 − 934 = 238 game states
that were almost-sure losing for P1 became winning for her,
when P1 incorporated P2’s misperception into her planning
to synthesize a deceptive strategy.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a hypergame model to represent
the interactions between two players with asymmetric infor-
mation about their action capabilities. Then, we present an
algorithm to synthesize action-deceptive strategies in a two-
player turn-based zero-sum reachability games, where P2 has
incomplete information about the P1’s action capabilities. We
show that the synthesized strategy has two important and de-
sirable properties. First, the DASW strategy is guaranteed to
satisfy the reachability objective with probability one. Sec-
ond, it is at least as powerful as the ASW strategy, because
the DASW region is a superset of the ASW region.
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